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Abstract
We take a class of games with two players and two actions which only
have mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We show that such games can only
have hybrid equilibria if played sequentially with one player moving ¯rst.
The hybrid equilibrium has the leader playing a mixed strategy but the
follower playing a pure strategy.
We apply this result to a game between a debtor and a lender fol-
lowing a loan contract. The debtor can have high or low revenues and
has to report his state to the lender. The lender can choose whether or
not to undertake a costly audit. With simultaneous play there is only
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with random cheating in reports and
auditing. With sequential play if the debtor moves ¯rst, there is zero
auditing and the debtor cheats as much as possible without giving the
incentive to audit. We argue that the setting of the game and the valu-
able ¯rst mover advantage of the debtor mean that we should expect the
game to be played sequentially with this hybrid outcome. This is impor-
tant in the context of the loan contract since the hybrid outcome makes
the contract renegotiation proof. Alternatively if the timing allowed the
lender to move ¯rst, then the equilibrium would have the debtor reporting
truthfully and the monitor auditing just su±ciently to ensure truthtelling
by the debtor. This has strong links to the optimal debt contract with no
commitment (Mookherjee-Png, 1989 and Jost, 1996). However we argue
that the natural timing of events makes the debtor the leader.
We then consider other examples and show that the same outcome
emerges in matching pennies and in a generic inspection game involving
adverse selection in labour markets.
Key words: mixed strategies, loan contracts, ¯rst mover advantage.
JEL Nos: C72, C73, D82
We know that every ¯nite game of complete information has a Nash equilib-
rium but that this may be in mixed strategies, there are also classes of games
e.g. inspection games where we know that the only Nash equilibria are in
mixed strategies. Also generally whether a game is played sequentially or si-
multaneously partly depends on the setting of the game: if there is a ¯rst mover
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1advantage to a single player, then if pre-game all players are on an equal footing,
we might expect the game to be played sequentially since otherwise that player
is giving something up. In this paper we examine two player, two action games
in which the only Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies. In this class we show
that if the game is played sequentially then the equilibrium outcome will have
the leader randomising in such a way that the follower is induced to play a pure
strategy. The equilibrium action of the leader moves as far as possible towards
the simultaneous play Nash outcome without also giving the follower the incen-
tive to randomise. Thus we have the result that games like those we take in
which the only simultaneous play Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies, have
only hybrid outcomes when played in pure strategies.
Next we examine various games. Our main example is taken from the area of
costly state veri¯cation loan contracts between two risk neutral parties. There
is a risk neutral entrepreneur who seeks ¯nance for a project; the project has
uncertain returns with two states: either revenues are high (yH) or low (yL).
The realised revenues are private information to the entrepreneur, but may be
audited by one or more of the risk neutral lenders at a cost of c: The result of
any audit is public information to all investors, as is the fact that there has been
an audit. All parties are risk neutral there is a safe interest rate r; together
with the loan size this determines the expected reservation return of the lender.
The problem is only of interest-there are only incentive problems for the ¯rm - if
revenues in the low state are insu±cient to repay the fair return on the loan. If
they were, a loan contract could just specify a constant return in each state and
then the ¯rm would have no incentive to cheat on its repayments. Otherwise
the repayments must vary by state in such a way as to give an expected return
on the loan equal to the fair interest rate. But then since the repayment in
the high state must be higher than that in the low state, there is an incentive
problem for the ¯rm: it would like to repay the amount corresponding to the
low state even if the true state is high.
Given that monitoring the state is costly and that any act of monitoring must
be voluntary, in the literature there are two ways of generating the incentive
to monitor. Firstly the incentive can be built into the loan contract problem
by de¯ning a premium repayment to be made that covers the observation costs
whenever there is an audit-then the contract can induce truthtelling by the
debtor (Jost, 1996). This is outside the noncooperative scenario we wish to
analyse and so we do not consider it here.
Secondly there is the scenario in which monitoring is not contractible and
is left to determination at the expost stage (Khalil-Parigi, Persons, Krasa-
Villamil). Here the paradigm in the literature that we wish to address has
the ¯rm and investor(s) signing a contract that ¯xes only the loan size and re-
payments, conditioned on the reported state and the result of any audit. The
actual reported state of the ¯rm and the probability of audit are determined
as mutual best responses in a simultaneous noncooperative game. That is the
contract is ¯rst signed; next the state is revealed to the ¯rm only and ¯nally
there is a Nash equilibrium in the probabilities of the high state ¯rm cheating
in its report of the state and in the probability of audit. A general ¯nding of
2this literature is that this form of contract is not renegotiation proof (Persons,
Khalil-Parigi). The idea here is that in the Nash equilibrium, whether it has
cheating or not, there is a positive probability of monitoring (at a cost) so that
it is possible for one party to make an o®er prior to the monitoring that will
be a Pareto improvement leading to zero monitoring costs and weakly (at least)
increase the returns of both the ¯rm and each monitor.
In this context our point is that there is a "natural" time line for the game
after the signing of the contract that means the game is sequential rather than
simultaneous. Since the debtor learns his state privately ¯rst, he has a natural
¯rst mover advantage. This matters because the subgame perfect equilibrium of
this sequential game actually has zero monitoring and a positive probability of
cheating-the ¯rm naturally acts as leader and cheats as much as they can so long
as they do not incur the risk of monitoring. But if the game is sequential (which
at the renegotiation stage is recognised in Persons) then it is renegotiation proof
since, as there is no monitoring, there is no deadweight loss that can be shared
between the ¯rm and the investor(s).
Other games that fall in this class are matching pennies and a paradigm for
adverse selection in labour markets which we take as a generic example of an
inspection game. Also if we allow for communication at the interim stage then
the solution is renegotiation proof.
So far as loan contracts with costly state veri¯cation are concerned, we
conclude that the outcome given the "natural" timing of events and actions, is
a contract leading to an equilibrium in which there is no costly monitoring and
a a small enough amount of cheating not to trigger monitoring.
The plan of the paper is to outline the abstract game and show the di®erence
between the simultaneous and sequential play solutions in Section 1. In Section 2
we apply these results to the loan contract game arguing that the most plausible
outcome is that of a Nash equilibrium in which the debtor randomly cheats as
much as possible without inducing the lender to audit. In section 3 we brie°y
discuss other situations that fall within this class (matching pennies, adverse
selection in labour markets), and in section 4 we conclude.
1 The General Result
With two players and only two actions for each player (x for player 1; y for
player 2), in general terms write the payo® functions for a potential leader L













1 by pL; pL
2 with 1 ¡ pL;pF
1 by pF and pF
2 with 1 ¡ pF
EUL = pLpFuL(x1;y1) + (1 ¡ pL)pFuL(x2;y1) (2)
+(1 ¡ pF)pLuL(x1;y2) + (1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ pF)uL(x2;y2)
EUF = pLpFuF(x1;y1) + (1 ¡ pL)pFuF(x2;y1)
+(1 ¡ pF)pLuF(x1;y2) + (1 ¡ pL)(1 ¡ pF)uF(x2;y2)
where xi;yj are respectively actions of leader and follower; pL
i ;pF
j are the prob-
abilities with which these actions are chosen in a general mixed strategy.
1.1 Simultaneous Play
The simultaneous play Nash equilibrium is pL¤;pF¤ such that
pL¤ = argmaxEUL(pL¤;pF¤);pF¤ = argmaxEUF(pL¤;pF¤)
For there to be no pure strategy Nash equilibrium it must be that
uF(xi;yj) > uF(xi;yk);k 6= j ) there is i0 uL(xi0;yj) > uL(xi;yj)
Ordering the actions of players so that yi is a best response to xi this con-
dition becomes
uF(x1;y1) > uF(x1;y2) and uL(x2;y1) > uL(x1;y1) (3)
and
uF(x2;y2) > uF(x2;y1) and uL(x1;y2) > uL(x2;y2) (4)
So when (3)-(4) hold the Nash equilibrium must be in mixed strategies satisfying
pFuL(x1;y1) + (1 ¡ pF)uL(x1;y2) = pFuL(x2;y1) + (1 ¡ pF)uL(x2;y2) (5)
pLuF(x1;y1) + (1 ¡ pL)uF(x2;y1) = pLuF(x1;y2) + (1 ¡ pL)uF(x2;y2) (6)
which we can rewrite as
0 = pF [uL(x1;y1) ¡ uL(x2;y1) ¡ uL(x1;y2) + uL(x2;y2)] + [uL(x2;y1) ¡ uL(x2;y2)]
(7)
0 = pL [uF(x1;y1) ¡ uF(x2;y1) ¡ uF(x1;y2) + uF(x2;y2)] + [uF(x2;y1) ¡ uF(x2;y2)]
(8)
These equations determine the mixed strategy, note that (3) and (4).automatically
imply that the equilibrium probabilities from (7) and (8) are in the interior of
the unit interval. And of course if (7),(8) fail to hold then one or other player
will not randomise-for example suppose that pL is such that
pL [uF(x1;y1) ¡ uF(x2;y1)] + uF(x2;y1) > pL [uF(x1;y2) ¡ uF(x2;y2)] + uF(x2;y2)
then F will set pF = 1:
41.2 Sequential Play
Now consider sequential play with L as leader. If L sets pL to satisfy (8) then
he cannot predict F0s response; F is indi®erent between any set of probabilities
pF. For this choice of pL to be optimal for L, it would have to be the case that
@EUL
@pF = 0 (9)
or
0 = pLuL(x1;y1) + (1 ¡ pL)uL(x2;y1) ¡ pLuL(x1;y2) ¡ (1 ¡ pL)uL(x2;y2) (10)
= pL [uL(x1;y1) ¡ uL(x2;y1) ¡ uL(x1;y2) + uL(x2;y2)] + [uL(x2;y1) ¡ uL(x2;y2)]
Eliminating pL between (8) and (10) gives
[uF(x2;y2) ¡ uF(x2;y1)][uL(x1;y1) ¡ uL(x2;y1) ¡ uL(x1;y2) + uL(x2;y2)]
(11)
= [uL(x2;y2) ¡ uL(x2;y1)][uF(x1;y1) ¡ uF(x2;y1) ¡ uF(x1;y2) + uF(x2;y2]
But (11) and (3)-(4) are mutually contradictory. If the simultaneous play
game has no pure strategy equilibrium the LHS is negative whilst the RHS is
positive. Thus any two person, two action game that only has a mixed strategy
solution when played simultaneously cannot have a mixed strategy solution
when played sequentially.
What is the sequential solution if (3)-(4) hold? Since under these conditions
@2EUF=@pF@pL > 0; if pL > pL¤; the follower responds with pF = 1 whilst if
pL < pL¤; the followers response is pF = 0: By setting pL marginally above pL¤
the leader gets arbitrarily close to
E(ULjpF = 1) = pL¤uL(x1;y1) + (1 ¡ pL¤)u(x2;y1)
whilst by setting pL marginally below pL¤ the leader gets arbitrarily close to
E(ULjpF = 0) = pL¤uL(x1;y2) + (1 ¡ pL¤)u(x2;y2)
The di®erence between these is
E(ULjpF = 1) ¡ E(ULjpF = 0) = pL¤[uL(x1;y1) ¡ uL(x2;y1) ¡ uL(x1;y2) + uL(x2;y2)]
+uL(x2;y1) ¡ uL(x2;y2)
The coe±cient of pL¤ is positive but the intercept in this expression is of ambigu-
ous sign. Hence if uL(x2;y1) > uL(x2;y2) for sure the leader sets pL marginally
above pL¤ and the follower responds with pF = 1: More generally solving for
pL¤ from (4) if
[uF(x2;y2) ¡ uF(x2;y1)][uL(x1;y1) ¡ uL(x2;y1) ¡ uL(x1;y2) + uL(x2;y2)]
+[uL(x2;y1) ¡ uL(x2;y2)][uF(x1;y1) ¡ uF(x2;y1) ¡ uF(x1;y2) + uF(x2;y2] > 0
the leader sets pL marginally above pL¤; whilst if it is negative the leader sets
pL marginally below pL¤:
5Proposition 1 If a two player two action game only has a simultaneous play
NE in mixed strategies, the sequential play solution cannot have both players
randomising but will have the leader randomising and the follower playing a
pure strategy.
2 A Loan Game With CSV
The scenario is that the loan contract has been signed, the debtor has borrowed
funds from the lender and at repayment time the debtors assets are private
information to the debtor and can be either high (yH) or low (yL). They are high
with exogenous probability p: The low state revenues are insu±cient to repay
the fair return on the loan but the project that the loan ¯nances is basically
pro¯table in expected value terms. The loan contract stipulates repayments that
must be made, and in order to secure the fair return on the loan the high type
debtor must make higher expected repayments than the low type. To determine
which repayment is due requires the debtor to report his revenues to the lender.
As well as this there may be an audit before the repayments are made so that
the contract can set repayments that are conditioned both on the report and
the results of any costly audit that may be undertaken. The contract speci¯es
that if the debtor reports e H they have to repay RH if either there is no audit
or if there is an audit and the true state is found to be H; if the debtor reports
e H but the true state following audit of this report is found to be L the debtor
has to repay RLH = yL
1: If the debtor reports e L and they are audited then if
the true state is L they have to repay RLL or if the the true state is H they
have to repay RHL = yH: If following a report of e L they are not audited then
they have to repay RL: For feasibility RLL;RL ￿ yL and RH ￿ yH: We assume
that (1 ¡ p)RLL ¡ c ￿ (1 ¡ p)RL and RL < RLL so that to the lender there
is no expected gain from auditing a truthful low state report but at least some
contribution to covering monitoring costs through the premium of RLL over RL.
We also assume that pyH +(1¡p)RLL¡c¡RL > 0 so that the expected return
to the lender from monitoring a low state report is positive and that RH > RL
(essentially this follows from the requirement that to yield the fair return, high
state repayments must exceed low state repayments in expectation).
2.1 Simultaneous Reporting and Auditing Strategy Choice
Here after the contract is signed, nature determines the borrower type. Then
as simultaneous best responses the lender and debtor must select strategies. A
strategy for the lender is a decision to monitor or not, A strategy for the debtor
is a report to make (high e H or low e L) if he has high income and a report to
make ( high e H or low e L) if he has low income. In terms of a payo® matrix we
have
1We skip over the details but essentially in this scenario the contract must involve maxi-
mum punishment for detected cheating (Persons,1996; Khalil-Parigi 1998).
6Monitor No Monitor
e HjH; e HjL
pRH + (1 ¡ p)yL ¡ c
(yH ¡ RH;0)
RH
(yH ¡ RH;yL ¡ RH)
e HjH; e LjL pRH + (1 ¡ p)RLL ¡ c
(yH ¡ RH;yL ¡ RLL)
pRH + (1 ¡ p)RL
(yH ¡ RH;yL ¡ RL)
e LjH; e HjL
p(yH ¡ c) + (1 ¡ p)(yL ¡ c)
(0;0)
pRL + (1 ¡ p)RH
(yH ¡ RL;yL ¡ RH)
e LjH; e LjL p(yH ¡ c) + (1 ¡ p)(RLL ¡ c)
(0;yL ¡ RLL)
pRL + (1 ¡ p)RL
(yH ¡ RL;yL ¡ RL)
In the table the columns are for the lender, the ¯rst number in each cell is
the expected return that the lender gets if he takes the action of that column
and the borrower is following the row strategies. The rows list the strategies
that the borrower could follow with the ¯rst being the report conditional on his
type and (the second row of each cell) the payo® that he would receive if his
income is high, the second if his income is low. Then his possible strategies are
( e HjH);(e LjH);( e HjL);(e LjL):
The strategy e HjH; e HjL is dominated by e HjH; e LjL for the debtor and the
strategy e LjH; e HjL is dominated by e LjH; e LjL for the debtor: Hence the lender
can eliminate these strategies of the debtor which leaves us with the reduced
matrix
Monitor No Monitor
e HjH; e LjL
pRH + (1 ¡ p)RLL ¡ c
(yH ¡ RH;yL ¡ RLL)
pRH + (1 ¡ p)RL
(yH ¡ RH;yL ¡ RL)
e LjH; e LjL
p(yH ¡ c) + (1 ¡ p)(RLL ¡ c)
(0;yL ¡ RLL)
pRL + (1 ¡ p)RL
(yH ¡ RL;yL ¡ RL)
This game has no pure strategy solution. If the lender monitors the best
response of the high type debtor is (strictly) to report e H and the low type
debtor always reports e L anyway. But if the debtor plays e HjH; e LjL the lenders
best response is not to monitor since (1¡p)(RLL ¡RL) < c. If the lender does
not monitor, the best response of the high type debtor is to report e L and again
the low type always reports low, but the best response of the lender to e L; e L is
to monitor as p(yH ¡ c) + (1 ¡ p)(RLL ¡ c) > RL: There is a mixed strategy
solution: let m be the probability of monitoring and lH the probability that the
high type debtor reports low (i.e. the probability the debtor follows e HjH; e LjL):
The borrowers expected utility becomes conditional on his type; so does his
probability of falsely reporting lH;lL
EDjH = lH(1 ¡ m)(yH ¡ RL) + (1 ¡ lH)(yH ¡ RH)
EDjL = m(yL ¡ RLL) + (1 ¡ m)(yL ¡ RL)
Similarly the lenders expected payo® is
EM = p[(1 ¡ lH)RH + lHfm(yH ¡ c) + (1 ¡ m)RLg] + (1 ¡ p)[m(RLL ¡ c) + (1 ¡ m)RL]















Thus when the borrower is of low type there is a pure strategy equilibrium;
when of high type a mixed strategy equilibrium. If the debtors actually played
these strategies it would reveal their type: the lender has to make a best response
against either e L for lL = 0 or lH: One might argue that with simultaneous play
the lender does not know what the borrower will declare. If he does not there is
one Nash equilibrium with high type which is mixed, and one Nash equilibrium
with low type which is (L¤;L¤);NM:
2.2 Sequential Reporting and Auditing Strategy Choice
Suppose the game is played sequentially with the borrower as leader. If of high
type the borrower would get expected utility (1 ¡ m)(yH ¡ RL) from declaring
e L with lH = 1: If he does this the lenders expected utility is
EMje L = m[
plH
(1 ¡ p) + plH
yH +
(1 ¡ p)
(1 ¡ p) + plH
RLL ¡ c] + (1 ¡ m)RL
= m(pyH + (1 ¡ p)RLL ¡ c) + (1 ¡ m)RL
so @EMje L=@m = plHyH +(1¡p)RLL¡c¡RL = pyH +(1¡p)RLL¡c¡RL > 0
and the lender would always monitor. So the debtor would actually get 0: If he
declares e H with lH = 0 the lender would get
EMj e H = m[pRH + (1 ¡ p)RLL ¡ c] + (1 ¡ m)[pRH + (1 ¡ p)RL]
and the lender would never monitor. So the debtor would get yH ¡ RH: So











= p(yH ¡ RL ¡ c) > 0
the high type debtor could always set 0 < lH < [(1¡p)(RL¡RLL)+c]=[p(yH ¡
RL)] and then the lender will not monitor. Then this debtors return is EDjH =
8yH ¡lHRL ¡(1¡lH)RH which exceeds his return from truthfully reporting so
long as lH is close to [(1 ¡ p)(RL ¡ RLL) + c]=[p(yH ¡ RL)]: So we have the
result that when played sequentially the high type debtor will cheat as often as
possible without inducing the lender to monitor.
On the other hand if played sequentially the low type will still report truth-
fully and the lender will not monitor so here sequential or simultaneous play
lead to the same outcome.
Given the timing of events: nature chooses the debtor type which is private
information to the debtor, the debtor has a ¯rst mover advantage. There is a
gain from the debtor getting in ¯rst with his report, and he is in a position to
do this. The natural way to play the game is for the debtor to act as leader
rather than having either simultaneous noncooperative play leading to the usual
Nash equilibrium, or sequential play with the lender acting as leader. If there
was some way in which the lender could preempt the report of the debtor -
for example by writing the audit strategy into the contract before the debtor
knows his type- then the outcome will be identical to the Jost type of contract.
There will be random monitoring of just a su±ciently high degree to enforce
truthtelling by the high type debtor.
3 Inspection and Related Games
In the literature, inspection games are highlighted as cases in which there is
often only a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium outcome when the game is played
simultaneously. We consider two cases and show that our main result applies.
3.1 Matching Pennies




The payo® of the row player is shown ¯rst: he wins if the outcomes match,
the column player wins if the outcomes disagree. This game has no pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium. If we allow for mixed strategies where pR;(pC) are the
probability that the row (column) player shows H (heads) then the expected
payo®s are
ER = pRpC + (1 ¡ pR)(1 ¡ pC) ¡ pR(1 ¡ pC) ¡ pC(1 ¡ pR)
EC = pR(1 ¡ pC) + pC(1 ¡ pR) ¡ pRpC ¡ (1 ¡ pR)(1 ¡ pC)
giving optimal mixed strategies of pR = pC = 0:5 and a zero expected payo® to
each.
Now suppose that this was played as a staged game with R moving ¯rst and










1,-1 -1,1 -1,1 1,-1
C
Figure 1:
If R plays a pure strategy (H or T) then C can play the opposite so that
for sure R loses and C wins. Whatever R does he cannot prevent this. If R
played a mixed strategy i.e. he chooses pR then if pR > 0:5; C will respond with
the pure strategy T for sure which will give payo®s ER = (1 ¡ pR) > 0 and
EC = pR > 0. R's best choice is then the lowest pR > 0:5; which of course does
not exist. But if R set pR = 0:5 then C0s expected payo® is zero whatever pC
he chooses and so is R0s: Similarly if R sets pR below 0:5; C responds with H
for sure and each player has a positive expected return. So there are multiple ²
leadership optima with pR either marginally above or marginally below 0:5:
3.2 An Inspection Game
The generic inspection game presented by Fudenberg and Tirole (1993, example
1.7) is in the context of a shirking worker and a ¯rm who may inspect the worker
at a cost. It has a payo® matrix:
I NI
S 0;¡h w;¡w
W w ¡ g;v ¡ w ¡ h w ¡ g;v ¡ w
where the row player is a worker who may either shirk (S) or work (W), and
the column player is the employer, who can either inspect (I) or not inspect
(NI). The worker's payo® is given ¯rst out of the two numbers in each cell. If
the worker shirks he receives a zero payo® if inspected but otherwise receives the
wage w. If he works, it costs him e®ort g < w but receives the wage whether
or not he is inspected. Valuable output is produced for the ¯rm only if the
worker works and then its value is v > w. Finally, an inspection costs the ¯rm
h < w: Here v > w > h and w > g: This game (which is very similar to the
10loan contract game) has no pure strategy equilibrium with simultaneous play.
If the worker shirks it is best to inspect but if the ¯rm inspects it is best for
the worker to work. If the worker works it is best for the ¯rm not to inspect
but if the ¯rm does not inspect it is best for the worker to shirk. Of course it
has a simultaneous play mixed strategy equilibrium: if ! is the probability the
worker works and ¶ the probability the ¯rm inspects, the expected payo® to the
worker is
EW = !(w ¡ g) + (1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ ¶)w
and to the ¯rm is
EF = ¶[!(v ¡ w ¡ h) ¡ (1 ¡ !)h] + (1 ¡ ¶)[!(v ¡ w) ¡ (1 ¡ !)w]
and a mixed strategy equilibrium occurs at ¶ = g=w;! = (w ¡ h)=w:
Now suppose that this game is played sequentially with the worker moving












0,v-w-h w-g,v-w 0,-h w,-w
Figure 2:
If the worker shirks the best response of the ¯rm is to inspect; if the worker
works the best response of the ¯rm is not to inspect. But suppose the worker
sets an irrevocable !: since @EF=@¶ = ¡h + (1 ¡ !)w; if ! > (w ¡ h)=w the
best response of the ¯rm is not to inspect in which case the expected payo®s are
EW = w¡!g ￿ w¡(w¡h)g=w;EF = !(v¡w)¡(1¡!)w: On the other hand
if ! < (w ¡ h)=w the best response of the ¯rm is to inspect for sure and the
expected payo®s of the two parties are EW = !(w¡g) ￿ (w¡h)(w¡g)=w;EF =
!(v¡w¡h)¡(1¡!)h: If the worker chooses ! = (w¡h)=w; the ¯rm is indi®erent
between inspecting or not and the workers payo® is (w¡h)(w¡g)=w+h(1¡¶) =
w ¡ h ¡ (w ¡ h)g=w + h(1 ¡ ¶) ￿ w ¡ (w ¡ h)g=w:
11By choosing an ! close to but above (w ¡ h)=w; the workers payo® from
making the ¯rm not inspect for sure exceeds that from making the ¯rm inspect
for sure since
[w ¡ (w ¡ h)g=w] ¡ [(w ¡ h)(w ¡ g)=w] = h > 0 (13)
On the other hand the worker is also better o® from making the ¯rm not inspect
than than from setting ! = (w ¡ h)=w :
[w ¡ (w ¡ h)g=w] ¡ [w ¡ h ¡ (w ¡ h)g=w + h(1 ¡ ¶)] (14)
= ¶h > 0 (15)
So the best strategy for the worker is to choose the lowest !;! > (w¡h)=w and
induce the ¯rm not to inspect. This sequential solution has much in common
with that of the loan game and matching pennies: the leader never wishes to
induce the follower to select a mixed strategy.
4 Conclusions
We have shown that two player, two action games in which the only simultane-
ous play Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies cannot have a mixed strategy
outcome when the game is played sequentially with one of the players moving
¯rst. Instead the outcome will have a hybrid form in which the ¯rst mover
randomises and the follower responds with a pure strategy. The leader induces
a pure response from the follower to the leaders advantage. In the games con-
sidered, the leader wants to set his random strategy as close as possible to, but
distinct from, his simultaneous play mixed strategy. With sequential play he is
strictly better o® doing this than playing the mixed strategy, but since there
is no closest point to his mixed strategy, his optimal sequential behaviour is ²
optimal. How the game is played depends on the setting. If the players are an
incumbent and a potential entrant then often there is a natural sense in which
the incumbent is the leader. If the game is one of one-sided incomplete infor-
mation where one player is perfectly informed and the other is not then there is
often a sense in which the informed party is the leader. In such cases the leader
has a valuable ¯rst mover advantage which they will wish to retain by acting
as leader so we would expect such games to be played sequentially rather than
simultaneously. In such games our result is important because it predicts that
the equilibrium outcome will have a hybrid form.
We apply the result to a scenario where a loan has been made between two
risk neutral parties with a contract that requires a high revenue debtor to make
higher repayments than a low revenue debtor. The revenues of the debtor are
private information to the debtor. The debtors strategy is a choice of report of
his revenues; the high revenue debtor has an incentive to cheat in the report in
order to make the low repayment. The lenders strategy is a costly audit choice.
With simultaneous play the game only has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
outcome with random cheating and auditing. However if the debtor is the leader
12and the game is played sequentially, the equilibrium has a hybrid form in which
the debtors randomly cheats as much as he can without inducing the lender
to ever audit. Thus the follower is playing a pure strategy-there is no costly
auditing and there is as much cheating as possible consistent with zero auditing.
Since audit cannot be performed until the report has been made and since the
debtor knows his revenues before the report, we argue that it is natural to
expect this game to be played sequentially with the debtor moving ¯rst. Doing
so makes the debtor better o® than with simultaneous play. If the lender could
somehow preempt the ¯rst mover advantage of the debtor and initially declare
an audit strategy, then the outcome is that the lender will audit just su±ciently
¯ercely to deter the debtor from ever cheating in his report. However this has
credibility problems: if the lender does this, the debtor responds with truthful
reports but then the lender will have no incentive to undertake the costly audit.
A way round this might be to try to write the audit strategy into the loan
contract (Jost) together with a sequential rationality constraint that ensures
that the audit strategy will actually be implemented. However generally this
is not renegotiation proof and so is not attainable. The alternative where the
debtor is leader is renegotiation proof since as there is zero auditing there are
no deadweight losses (the audit costs) available for sharing between the players.
There are other related games eg in tax avoidance games we predict that the
most likely outcome is that tax payers cheat as much as they can without
inducing the tax authorities to perform a costly audit. If the tax authorities
could preempt this by moving ¯rst they would announce an audit policy that is
su±ciently ¯erce to prevent tax payers from ever cheating, but again this would
have credibility problems.
We show that matching pennies and a generic form of inspection game also
have the property that simultaneous play only has mixed strategy Nash equi-
libria. Hence our result applies here as well.
One weakness of the approach is that it depends on only two states, with two
players and more than two actions/states it fails to hold. It is an open question
whether it holds if the number of players is equal to the number of states.
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